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Standing Under Rule 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps
Since the recognition of private remedies' for the enforcement
of rule 10b-5,2 there has been much controversy over what class of
persons the rule was designed to protect and who should be granted
standing to enforce its provisions. Neither the rule nor section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,1 under which
the rule was promulgated,5 are explicit in defining the requirements
one must meet to maintain a suit. The potential sweep of the statute
and the rule in prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities is exceedingly broad, and courts have recognized
the need to limit standing both to minimize the possibility of abuse
by litigants6 and to preclude an application of federal law not in-
1. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Su-
preme Court first recognized a private remedy for the enforcement of rule lob-5 in
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. See, e.g., Fuller, Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: Tolls the Knell
of Parting Day?, 25 MiAMI L. REv. 13'1 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birn-
baum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule l0b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Com-
ment, Rule 10b-5: Protection for an Amorphous Class, 68 DicK. L. REV. 661
(1974); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining
Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEo. LJ. 1177 (1968); Comment, lob-5 Standing
Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973);
Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 14
VILL. L. REv. 499 (1969).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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tended by Congress in an area preferably controlled by state corpora-
tion law.7
For over twenty years, any analysis of standing began with the
decision by an eminent panel' of the Second Circuit in Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp.,9 which held that only actual purchasers or
sellers of securities had the right to bring a rule 1Ob-5 action. 10
Although subsequent cases nominally affirmed the validity of the
Birnbaum rule, courts increasingly recognized that the rule was ar-
bitrary, since the actual purchase or sale of a security is frequently
irrelevant to the perpetration of securities frauds." To effect the
broad antifraud purposes to which they believed rule 10b-5 was di-
rected,' 2 many courts liberally interpreted the policies of Birnbaum
to include within its scope investors who had suffered injury from
a securities fraud but who had not in fact been purchasers or sell-
ers. 13 The repeated modification, circumvention, and outright re-
jection of the Birnbaum rule by the lower courts clearly undermined
its force and appeared to portend its demise; during the 1974-75 term,
however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Birnbaum rule in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.'4 At a time when litigation under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is rapidly expanding,' 5 this pronounce-
7. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
8. The panel consisted of Augustus Hand, who wrote the opinion, Learned Hand,
and Chief Judge Thomas Swan.
9. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
10. Plaintiffs in Birnbaum were minority shareholders of the Newport Steel Cor-
poration. They brought a class action under lob-5 against the president and control-
ling shareholder, claiming that he sold his controlling stock in the company at a sub-
stantial premium. The plaintiffs maintained that the sale and certain misrepresenta-
tions made by the president amounted to fraudulent practices in connection with the
purchase and sale of securities within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-
5; they sought to recover the misappropriated corporate asset. The court, dismissing
the action, concluded that section 10(b) was not directed at "fraudulent mismanage-
ment of corporate affairs" but rather "solely at that type of misrepresentation or
fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities." 193
F.2d at 464. Rule lOb-5, the court declared, "extended protection only to the de-
frauded purchaser or seller." 193 F.2d at 464.
11. See, e.g., Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973); Tully
v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
12. See Lowenfels, supra note 3, at 275.
13. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973); Tully v. Mott
Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
14. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
15. The increasingly large number of suits brought under rule 10b-5 and the at-
tention given to it by the business community suggest that the rule is having a consid-
erable impact on investors, brokers, and corporate management. See Rekant v.
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ment may serve to limit greatly the number of parties who have stand-
ing to recover for securities fraud.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the opinion in Blue Chip
and to ascertain the content of the Birnbaum rule as it exists today.
It will first discuss the opinion of the Court in Blue Chip itself and
delineate the primary policy considerations upon which the majority
focused. It will then apply these policy considerations to the major
categories of case law that have arisen subsequent to Birnbaum and
analyze the validity of this case law in light of Blue Chip.
I. Blue Chip Stamps
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 6 had its genesis in an
antitrust action brought by the United States against Blue Chip
Stamp Company and a group of grocery chains for violations of the
Sherman Act in the trading stamp business. 17 In settlement of the
antitrust action, the Blue Chip Stamp Company and the nine retail
merchandisers entered into a consent decree that required the re-
organization of the company and a reduction of the holdings of the
nine stockholders. This reduction was to be achieved through is-
suance of fifty-five per cent of the common stock of the new com-
pany to the retail users of Blue Chip stamps who were not share-
holders in the original company. The offering was to be made in
units consisting of three shares of stock and a $100 debenture in
amounts proportional to the nonshareholders' use of the stamps. It
was intended as a bargain: the cost per unit to the nonshareholder-
user was $101, although the divesting shareholders knew each unit
had a reasonable market value of $315.18 The tender of these units,
which were registered under the Securities Act of 1933,19 was made
through a prospectus requiring the nonshareholder-users to exercise
Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403,
406 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lowenfels, Rule lob-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Ac-
tion, 18 VAND. L. REv. 893, 895 (1965); Ruder, Challenging Corporation Action
Under Rule lOb-5, 25 Bus. LAw. 75, 76 (1969).
16. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
17. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
afld. inem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580
(1968). Included as defendants in the antitrust suit were major retail merchandisers
who owned ninety per cent of the stock of Blue Chip Stamp Company and used trad-
ing stamps issued by Blue Chip to stimulate business. See Manor Drug Stores v.
Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1973), revd., 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
18. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1973),
revd., 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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their rights within three months. Any shares not purchased by them
could be sold by the defendants in the open market.20
Approximately fifty per cent of the units offered to nonshare-
holder-users were not purchased2 and apparently were sold to the
public at a higher price one year later.2" Two years after the offer-
ing, Manor Drug Stores brought a class action on behalf of itself and
other nonshareholder-users alleging that defendants23 had violated
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 by issuing a materially misleading pro-
spectus. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had intentionally
dissuaded them from purchasing Blue Chip shares by making the
prospectus unnecessarily pessimistic, 24 so that rejected shares could
be offered to the public at a higher price. 25 The prospectus issued
for the public sale of new Blue Chip shares omitted the alleged mis-
representations and, thus, was far less pessimistic than the first offer-
ing.26 The plaintiffs sought to recover damages equal to the differ-
ence between the offering price of the shares and, their fair market
value, the right to purchase the "rejected" units at the original offer-
ing price, and twenty-five million dollars in exemplary damages.2"
The district court, pointing out that a nonparty to an antitrust con-
sent decree lacks standing to enforce any rights or duties of that decree,
dismissed the action on the ground that plaintiffs' status as intended
20. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 37 (C.D. Cal.
1971), revd., 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), revd., 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
21. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 726 (1975).
22. Blue Chip Stamps, the reorganized Blue Chip Stamp Company, offered its
own shares to the public one year later. Plaintiffs maintained that the shares sold
by Blue Chip Stamps pursuant to this offering were in fact the same shares offered
to them one year earlier. 492 F.2d at 139 n.7.
23. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Blue Chip Stamp Company (Old Blue
Chip), Blue Chip Stamps (New Blue Chip), eight of the nine majority shareholders
of Old Blue Chip, and the directors of New Blue Chip. 421 U.S. at 726. None
of the courts in the Blue Chip litigation distinguished among these defendants in their
analysis.
24. The following statements in the original prospectus issued by New Blue Chip
were alleged to be false and misleading:
(1) that "[n]et income for the current fiscal year will be adversely affected by
payments aggregating $8,486,000 made since March 2, 1968 in settlement of
claims" against New Blue Chip; (2) that net income "would be adversely af-
fected by a substantial decrease in the use of the Company's trading stamp serv-
ice"; (3) that net income "would be adversely affected by a sale of one-third
of the Company's trading stamp business in California"; (4) that "Claims or
Causes of Action (as defined) against the Company, including prayers for treble
damages, now aggregate approximately $29,000,000"; and (5) that, based upon
"statistical evaluations," "the Company presently estimates that 97.5% of all
stamps issued will ultimately be redeemed."
421 U.S. at 763-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), quoting original prospectus issued by
New Blue Chip.
25. 421 U.S. at 726-27.
26. 492 F.2d at 139-40.
27. 421 U.S. at 727.
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beneficiaries of a decree was also insufficient to establish standing
to sue the defendant under rule lOb-5.28 The court then considered
the relationship between the alleged fraud and the plaintiffs' dam-
ages and found it too uncertain to allow an accurate measurement
of the damages actually suffered. 29  However, in a divided opinion,
the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the consent decree served
the same evidentiary function as a contract for the sale of securities30
in defining a plaintiff class, causation, and the magnitude of dam-
ages " Thus, construction of the "purchaser-seller" standing re-
quirement to include the plaintiffs would be consistent with both the
antifraud purposes of section 10(b) and the policy of the Birnbaum
rule of limiting causes of action to those who have objective evidence
of loss and can show a causal connection between the loss and the
alleged fraud. Under this approach, both the size of the plaintiff
class and the amount of potential damages would have clearly de-
finable limits.
32
In a strong dissent that denounced this expansion of the purchaser-
seller doctrine, Judge Hufstedler disagreed with the view that the
rights created under a consent decree were the functional equivalent
of a contractual relationship. 33 She rejected the majority's conten-
28. 339 F. Supp. at 38.
29. See 339 F. Supp. at 40.
30. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14)
(1970) defines "sale" and "sell" broadly: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include
any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." The terms "buy" and "purchase" are
defined in an equally broad manner: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include
any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Securities Exchange Act §
3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970).
31. 492 F.2d at 142. Previously, in Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464
F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972), the Ninth Circuit had adopted the position that in order
to achieve 10b-5 standing a plaintiff need not be an actual purchaser or seller if he
were a party to a contract for the sale of securities. 464 F.2d at 346.
In a footnote, the majority of the court of appeals in Blue Chip dismissed as un-
important the unenforceability of the consent decree by the plaintiffs who, as non-
shareholder-users of Blue Chip Stamps, were not parties to the consent decree in the
antitrust suit between the United States and Blue Chip Stamp Company. The court
reasoned that the action was for a violation of rule 10b-5, not for a breach of duty
imposed by the decree. Since plaintiffs' reliance upon the decree was only incidental,
the extent of its enforceability was not crucial to the case. 492 F.2d at 142 n.14.
32. 492 F.2d at 142.
33. 492 F.2d at 143-44:
The functions of a contract and of the consent decree are, however, not the
same. A contract to purchase or to sell a security is the equivalent of a purchase
or sale because the statute by definition makes them equivalent. . . . A consent
divestiture decree cannot function similarly [to a contract] because it is not a"contract" within the meaning of the statute and because no statutory provision
equates "purchase" and "offer pursuant to a consent decree." The essential stat-
utory link between the appellants and "purchasers" is missing.
Thus, Judge Hufstedler declared as irrelevant any possible aid provided by a consent
decree in proving causation and damages. 492 F.2d at 144.
December 1976]
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tion that causation and damages are equally provable as between a
contract and a consent decree, 4 and argued that the plaintiffs posi-
tion was, in fact, no different from that of members of the general
investing public in a claim for damages stemming from their mere
failure to take advantage of a bargain.3 5  She maintained that the
majority had, therefore, provided no "neutral principles of law" by
which standing could be denied to any passive investor who alleged
fraudulently deceptive statements in a prospectus.3 6
Although the Supreme Court might have chosen to reverse the
Ninth Circuit decision on the narrow ground that a consent decree
is not the functional equivalent of a contractual relationship, the
Court undertook a broader analysis and reaffirmed the Birnbaum
rule as the touchstone for standing under rule 10b-5. The Court
based its decision on three primary grounds: (1) the acceptance of
the Birnbaum rule by the lower courts for twenty years coupled with
the refusal of Congress to alter the scope of section 10(b);"7 (2)
the inconsistency of allowing broader standing for plaintiffs under
the judicially created rule 10b-5 remedies than Congress had
allowed for explicit remedies in either the Securities Act of 1933
or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;38 and (3) the desirability
of limiting the potential for vexatious litigation and for speculative,
perhaps limitless, damages.39
It is surprising that, despite the considerable evidence indicating
a broad antifraud purpose underlying section 10(b), the majority
avoided any discussion of legislative history.40 In its only attempt
to ascertain congressional intent, the Court first noted what it viewed
as a longstanding acceptance by the lower courts of the Birnbaum
34. 492 F.2d at 144:
[Tihe appellants' ability to prove causation and damages cannot be likened
to that of parties who have contracted to buy or sell. Their situations are dis-
similar because a contract creates legal rights between the parties. Appellants
had no duties and no rights created by the consent decree. . . . Because the
consent decree creates no rights or duties in appellants, their commitment and
ability to purchase the offered securities are far less definite than in a case in
which a contract binds the parties. This want of definiteness renders appellants
far less able to prove causation and damages than those who have contracted
to buy securities and negates the "same function" conclusion that is the basis
for the majority's grant of standing.
35. See 492 F.2d at 145.
36. 492 F.2d at 147.
37. 421 U.S. at 731-33.
38. 421 U.S. at 733-36.
39. 421 U.S. at 737-49.
40. For a discussion of the legislative history of rule 10b-5, see 1 A. BROMBERO,
SECURMES LAw: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.2 (1974).
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rule."' It then cited the failure of Congress to adopt an amendment
proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that
would have changed the wording of section 10(b) from "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security" to "in connection with
the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any se-
curity." 2  The Court considered this persuasive evidence in favor
of continued acceptance of the Birnbaum rule for limiting standing
for implied civil remedies under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5." a
This argument of the Court is subject to substantial question.
First, it is dangerous to infer congressional acceptance of Birnbaum
from the mere failure of Congress to enact an amendment that, while
indeed overruling the case, may also have risked an expansion of
standing requirements far greater than that evidenced in the Birn-
baum exceptions themselves. It is particularly misleading to suggest
the affirmative support of Congress for a strict purchaser-seller lim-
itation based solely on the failure of a Senate subcommittee to adopt
such an amendment. 44  This is especially true in light of the evi-
dence contained in the original legislative history of section 10(b)
that "firmly indicates that the section was intended to be expan-
sive" 45 in curtailing fraudulent activities.46
It was upon this evidence that Justice Blackmun relied in dissent-
ing from the standing limitations imposed by Birnbaum. He cited
testimony of both the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, who introduced the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Thomas Corcoran, an SEC attorney who was a principal
draftsman of the Act, which indicated that section 10(b) was in-
tended to be "a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices"
47
by giving the SEC "power to forbid any . . . devices in connection
with security transactions which it [found] detrimental to the public
interest or to the proper protection of investors. ' 48  Justice Blackmun
41. 421 U.S. at 731-32.
42. 421 U.S. at 732 (emphasis original).
43. 421 U.S. at 733.-
44. See generally Hearings on S.1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1959).
45. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 40, § 2.2, at 331.
46. See id. § 2.2. This conclusion appears sound despite the majority's observa-
tion that "the express 'intent of Congress' as to. the contours of a private cause of
action under Rule l0b-5" cannot be divined. 421 U.S. at 737.
47. 421 U.S. at 766, quoting Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934)
(Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran).
48. 421 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added), quoting 78 CoNG. REC. 2271 (1934) (re-
marks of Senator Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Com-
merce, in introducing S. 2693, the bill that became the 1934 Act).
December 1976]
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further noted that the origins of rule 10b-5 similarly evidenced the
intent of the SEC broadly to prohibit fraudulent activity.4" The ma-
jority opinion, by not fully addressing the purposes of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, recognized a narrower application of these statutory
provisions than the evidence seems to warrant.
The majority also found support for limiting standing under sec-
tion 10(b) by drawing upon "[a]vailable extrinsic evidence from the
texts of the 1933 and 1934 Acts."5  The Court observed that sec-
tion 10(b) expressly prohibits only fraud "in connection with the
purchase or sale" of securities, whereas section 17(a) of the 1933
Act,5 the parallel antifraud provision from which the language of
10(b) was taken, expressly applies to fraud "in the offer or sale"
of securities. 2 Noting that "(w)hen Congress wished to provide a
remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little
trouble in doing so expressly," the Court concluded that Congress
intended to withhold protection from those defrauded merely in the
offer of securities. 53  Similarly, the Court observed that the "prin-
cipal express nonderivative private civil remedies, created by Con-
gress contemporaneously with the passage of § 10(b), for violations
of various provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are by their terms
expressly limited to purchasers or sellers of securities. ' 4  Thus, the
49. The dissent quotes the remarks of Milton Freeman, an SEC staff attorney
who was involved in the authorship of the rule, concerning the way in which the
rule was written:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was
then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just
been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Ad-
ministrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company
in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his
own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the com-
pany is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quad-
rupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we
can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked
at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the
only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase or
sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remem-
ber whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of
paper to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sum-
mer Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That
is how it happened.
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922
(1967), quoted in 421 U.S. at 767 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. 421 U.S. at 733.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
52. 421 U.S. at 733-34.
53. 421 U.S. at 734.
54. 421 U.S. at 735-36. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ lla, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§
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majority felt that "lilt would indeed be anomalous to impute to Con-
gress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied
cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable ex-
press causes of action." 5
This argument is misleading in two respects. It fails first to dis-
tinguish between the purposes of the separate acts."6 The 1933 Act
was designed to protect the investing public through registration of
new issues of securities, and, therefore, the language of its principal
antifraud provision naturally included the term "offer or sale." The
1934 Act, on the other hand, was intended to protect the investing
public in the subsequent exchange of securities. The phrase "pur-
chase or sale" clearly describes those transactions that were chiefly
on the minds of its framers. Failure to use the term "offer," which
in the 1933 Act referred specifically to offers of new securities,
surely is not evidence that Congress intended a narrow reading of
"purchase or sale." There was simply no reason to use a term-
"offer"-that would apply to such a limited number of situations
under the 1934 Act as originally contemplated. At the time of its
enactment, Congress could not have been expected to anticipate all
forms of securities fraud that might be invented and to foresee that
section 10(b) would become the basis for prolific litigation.
57
Secondly, it is somewhat disingenuous for the Court to state,
without any elaboration, that standing under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 should be no broader than the express remedies of the 1934
Act because the cause of action is judicially implied. It is certainly
reasonable to ask why the scope of standing to enforce a right should
be dependent upon whether the remedy is express or implied, rather
than upon the nature of the underlying substantive right. The anal-
ysis of the Court should have focused on whom the statute was de-
signed to protect and who is most appropriately situated to enforce
the statute in a manner consistent with the intended legislative
scheme. 8 If these features of section 10(b) were to indicate that
77k, 771 (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r
(1970).
55. 421 U.S. at 736.
56. The Court, after assuming for the sake of argument that the Birnbaum rule
could be circumvented on a case-by-case analysis, noted the different purposes of the
two securities acts in arguing that rule 10b-5 plaintiffs who are disappointed offerees
of a registered 1933 Act offering, as opposed to disappointed nonbuyers in post-dis-
tribution trading on the nation's stock exchanges and securities trading markets, are
the class of plaintiffs most properly precluded from suit by the Birnbaum rule. 421
U.S. at 751-54.
57. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 40, § 2.2.
58. These are the factors considered by the Court when implying a private rem-
edy for violation of the securities laws in the first instance. See J.I. Case Co. v.
December 1976]
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the plaintiff class should be larger than that allowed by other pro-
visions of the 1934 Act, which the legislative history indeed sug-
gests,59 then the fact that the remedy is judicially implied should not
be a limiting factor.
In reviewing the express causes of action under the 1934 Act,
the majority also noted that section 28(a) 0 of the Act limits re-
covery in a private action to "actual damages." The Court found
that this provision offered some support for the narrow purchaser-
seller rule, since that rule restricts standing to those having objective
evidence of the magnitude of their alleged injury:
While the damages suffered by purchasers and sellers pursuing a §
10(b) cause of action may on occasion be difficult to ascertain ....
in the main such purchasers and sellers at least seek to base re-
covery on a demonstrable number of shares traded. In contrast, a
putative plaintiff, who neither purchases nor sells securities but sues
instead for intangible economic injury such as loss of a noncontractual
opportunity to buy or sell, is more likely to be seeking a largely con-
jectural and speculative recovery in which the number of shares in-
volved will depend on the plaintiff's subjective hypothesis.0 1
This argument, although not extensively developed in the majority's
analysis of the 1934 Act, provides the basis for the Court's discussion
of the policy considerations militating against further liberalization
of the purchaser-seller limitation on standing under 1Ob-5-consid-
erations that "flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which
neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regula-
tions offer conclusive guidance." 62
In its discussion of policy considerations, the majority acknow-
ledged the arbitrary character of the Birnbaum standing restriction
and the injustice that may result from the exclusion of potential
plaintiffs who have been defrauded through violations of rule 10b-
5.03 But, when faced with the tension between providing relief to
plaintiffs presenting meritorious claims and the need for some work-
able limitation upon the scope of the plaintiff class, the Court felt
the net benefit of the Birnbaum rule was greater than that created
by the lack of a similar limitation. The primary basis for the Court's
affirmation of the Birnbaum rule was its apprehension over the
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (Court looked to congressional intent in determining purpose
and extent of protection under section 10(b)).
59. See note 49 supra & text at notes 47-48 supra.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
61. 421 U.S. at 734-35.
62. 421 U.S. at 737.
63. 421 U.S. at 738.
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possible flood of vexatious litigation that would result if the rule were
rejected or further diluted.
6 4
As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, any broadening of standing re-
quirements would enhance the frequency and burdensomeness of
nuisance or "strike" suits. This would occur because it is difficult
to dispose of an unworthy 1Ob-5 claim on the merits without a trial.
Through an extensive use of the liberal discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 65 a plaintiff would have the ability
to disrupt the defendant's normal business activity. As a result, the
complaint would be given a settlement value disproportionate to its
prospect of success at trial. 6 The majority observed:
[T]he Birnbaum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in
fact been damaged by violations of rule 10b-5, and to that extent
it is undesirable. But it also separates in a readily demonstrable
manner the group of plaintiffs who actually purchased or actually
sold, and whose version of the facts is therefore more likely to be
believed by the trier of fact, from the vastly larger world of potential
plaintiffs who might successfully allege a claim but could seldom suc-
ceed in proving it.67
Thus, an advantage of the rule is that it screens out those suits that
have the highest risk of being strike suits.
In addition, without the purchaser-seller limitation, courts would
be confronted by claims based upon "hazy issues of historical fact,"
the truth of which could only be established through uncorroborated
oral testimony.68 In rejecting the suggestion of the SEC, made in
its amicus brief, that courts in particular cases could require addi-
tional corroboration to minimize this danger,69 Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that "the very necessity, or at least the desirability, of
fashioning unique rules of corroboration and damages as a corre-
lative to the abolition of the Birnbaum rule suggests that the rule
itself may have something to be said for it."
7 0
A primary concern was that elimination of the Birnbaum rule
would allow parties to bring a 1Ob-5 action for their failure to pur-
chase or sell securities. In this situation, plaintiffs would be able
to present their claim of alleged fraud in violation of 1Ob-5 to the
jury on the strength of their uncorroborated testimony:
64. See 421 U.S. at 739-40.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
66. See 421 U.S. at 740-43.
67. 421 U.S. at 743.
68. 421 U.S. at 743.
69. See 421 U.S. at 746-47 n.10.
70. 421 U.S. at 744.
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The jury would not even have the benefit of weighing the plaintiff's
version against the defendant's version, since the elements to which
the plaintiff would testify would be in many cases totally unknown
and unknowable to the defendant. The very real risk in permitting
those in respondent's position to sue under Rule 1 Ob-5 is that the door
will be open to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one
who offers only his own testimony to prove that he ever consulted
a prospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to it, or that
the representations contained in it damaged him.71
Under these circumstances, the size of the plaintiff class would be
potentially limitless, and the damages alleged by any plaintiff would
be virtually impossible to assess accurately.
The Court felt that Birnbaum eliminated these problems. An
actual purchase or sale, it contended, provides "an objectively
demonstrable fact in an area of the law otherwise very much depend-
ent upon oral testimony. ' 72  In today's public securities market, in
which there is a broad dissemination of all financial information,
7 3
the rule has the merit of objectively limiting a plaintiff class that
would otherwise be undefinable.74 Moreover, the loss incurred by
one who has actually purchased or sold is much more readily ascer-
tainable, since the number and price of securities bought or sold are
objective facts.75
While thus reaffirming Birnbaum, the majority also examined
two other arguments that had been advanced to permit standing on
the facts of Blue Chip. First, Justice Rehnquist dealt directly with
the contention by Manor Drug Stores that, as the intended benefi-
ciary of an antitrust consent decree, it qualified as a purchaser of
securities for standing purposes under 10b-5. He agreed with the
Ninth Circuit dissent of Judge Hufstedler that, since a consent decree
was not enforceable by nonparties, there was no "functional equiva-
lency" to a contractual right to purchase issued securities. 70  The
71. 421 U.S. at 746.
72. 421 U.S. at 747.
73. The Court examined the growing tendency of courts to reject restrictions
upon standing such as the Birnbaum rule in the tort actions of deceit and misrepre-
sentation. However, the Court did not find these analogies useful because "the typi-
cal fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and deceit evolved
was light years away from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule 10b-5
is applicable." 421 U.S. at 744-45.
74. 421 U.S. at 747.
75. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal.
1971), revd., 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), revd., 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
76. See 421 U.S. at 749-50. The Court appears to misinterpret the notion of
"functional equivalence" posited by the Ninth Circuit majority. The inability of the
plaintiffs to enforce the consent decree was not considered by the Ninth Circuit to
be relevant. See note 31 supra. The Court of Appeals instead viewed the limitation
of the plaintiff class through the consent decree as serving the same function as a
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Court stressed that holders of contractual rights to purchase or sell
were within the scope of the purchaser-seller doctrine "not because
of a judicial conclusion that they were similarly situated to 'pur-
chasers' or 'sellers,' but because the definitional provisions of the
1934 Act themselves grant them such a status.17 7  Concluding that
plaintiffs failed to qualify as purchasers under the Act, the Court re-
fused to create an exception to the Birnbaum rule that would allow
recovery by a plaintiff who "was not only not a buyer or seller of
any security but . . .was not even a shareholder of the corporate
petitioners." ' s
Second, in language that anticipated future efforts to circumvent
the Court's affirmation of the purchaser-seller requirement, Justice
Rehnquist addressed the issue of standing for an implied action
under rule 10b-5 for violation of the 1933 Securities Act.70  He
drew an analogy between the positions of the plaintiff and a dis-
appointed offeree who failed to purchase stock because of a mis-
leading prospectus issued pursuant to a stock offering registered
under the 1933 Act. 0 Without directly ruling on the issue, 1 the
Court indicated its belief that Congress intended the remedies for
violation of the 1933 Act to be subject to express limitations and,
hence, that no implied action under rule 10b-5 should lie.
8 2
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Jus-
tices Douglas and Brennan, criticized the majority for demonstrating
a "preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being."8 3  The dis-
sent rejected the majority's interpretation of Birnbaum as being in-
contract in furnishing "objective evidence of a plaintiffs intention to purchase or sell
but for the fraud," in fixing the "price, quantity and time of sale," and in reasonably
circumscribing defendant's liability. 492 F.2d at 142. The Supreme Court even-
tually acquiesed to this view of the functional equivalence of a contract and a consent
decree, see 421 U.S. at 754-55, but nonetheless refused to analyze the issue by means
of functional analogues to "purchasers" or "sellers" or to "contracts to sell or pur-
chase," for fear of leaving "the Birnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case erosion."
421 U.S. at 755.
77. 421 U.S. at 451.
78. 421 U.S. at 451-52.
79. For discussions of an implied 10b-5 action for violations of the 1933 Act,
see 3 L. Loss, SECURrTiES REGULATION 1787-91 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 3915-17.
80. 421 U.S. at 752.
81. 421 U.S. at 752 n.15.
82. See 421 U.S. at 752-54. Regarding the general issue of an implied cause of
action under section 10b and rule lOb-5 for a violation of the 1933 Act, lower federal
courts have generally allowed such actions only when no express provision of the
1933 Act is thereby rendered meaningless. Compare Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (prohibiting a lob-5 action), with Thiele
v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 41.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (allowing a 10b-5 action).
83. 421 U.S. at 762.
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consistent with the broad scope and antifraud purposes intended by
Congress in enacting the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. Through
a review of the history of the statute and the rule, 4 the dissent under-
took to establish a congressional intent at odds with the majority's
narrow treatment of the subject. Blackmun maintained that "[ilt is
inconceivable that Congress could have intended a broad-ranging
antifraud provision, such as § 10(b), and at the same time, have
intended to impose, or deemed to welcome, a mechanical overtone
and requirement such as the Birnbaum requirement."8 5
After admonishing the majority for relying upon speculative
policy considerations,86 the dissent suggested an alternative to the
Birnbaum lOb-5 standing test: "the showing of a logical nexus be-
tween the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase of a security" -
a requirement that would supply the causal relationship between a
violation of rule 1Ob-5 and an investment decision made in reliance
on the defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Although
the suggested standard included the term "sale or purchase," the dis-
sent interpreted the word "sale" to encompass "the generalized
event of public disposal of property through the advertisement, auc-
tion, or some other market mechanism."88 Employing this standard,
the dissent would have allowed standing to the plaintiffs in Blue Chip
for the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the
court-ordered "sale."
8 9
The extent to which the dissent's nexus test is actually broader
than the Birnbaum rule is unclear. Contrary to Justice Powell, who
felt that the dissent advocated granting standing to any party who
claimed that a conservative prospectus had caused his failure to pur-
chase securities,90 nothing in the language of the dissent explicitly
suggested such a liberal standing doctrine. In practice the dissent's
"nexus" standard would almost certainly satisfy the primary policy
considerations of the majority, since the courts would evolve "[s]en-
sible standards of proof and of demonstrable damages"'" that would
84. See note 49 supra & text at notes 47-48 supra.
85. 421 U.S. at 770.
86. See 421 U.S. at 769-70.
87. 421 U.S. at 770.
88. 421 U.S. at 764.
89. See 421 U.S. at 764. For a federal court decision rejecting the Birnbaum rule
in favor of a nexus test similar to that of the Blue Chip dissent, see Eason v. Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974) (10b-5 standing granted to investors defrauded through securities transac-
tions). See note 103 infra.
90. See 421 U.S. at 760-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
91. 421 U.S. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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deny standing to those who had frivolous claims or were bringing
strike suits. Thus, in the hands of federal district and appellate
courts sensitive to burgeoning 1Ob-5 litigation, the dissent's "nexus"
would not be likely to produce the flood of litigation feared by the
majority. 2
II. THE CONTENT OF THE Birnbaum RULE
The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip is significant for
several reasons. The most obvious is that this was the first articu-
lation by the Court of standing requirements under section 10(b)
and rule 1Ob-5 after years of denying certiorari in cases where stand-
ing was directly at issue.93 This fact takes on even greater signifi-
cance when it is realized that the rule of standing that the Court
affirmed had been subject to substantial modification and even out-
right rejection in the lower courts,94 and that a number of commen-
tators had announced its demise.95
The plaintiffs in Blue Chip were individuals who had neither
purchased nor sold securities but nonetheless sought standing by
claiming to be within the original Birnbaum rule. Thus, the majority
could have simply denied plaintiffs standing on a narrow ground that
the consent decree was not functionally equivalent to a contractual
relationship. 6 Such a rationale, however, would have left future
92. However, with the expansion of standing on the basis of a flexible nexus
standard, there would be an increased probability of a complaint surviving a motion
for summary judgment. The dissent was willing to accept this cost to remedy frauds
that would not be actionable under a purchaser-seller limitation. On the merits,
plaintiffs in such frivolous suits would have a low probability of proving liability or
substantial damages under the standards of proof and demonstrable damages that
would evolve under the dissent's approach.
93. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.. 960 (1974); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin.
Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Kahan v. Rosen-
stiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Crane Co. v. West-
inghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
94. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (rejection); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972) (modification).
95. See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 49 TEx.
L. REV. 617 (1971); Bradford, Rule lOb-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19
BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1970); Fuller, supra note 3; Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain
Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20
BUFFALo L. REv. 93 (1970); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of
Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAW.
1289 (1971); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. Rv.
543 (1971).
96. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 143-46 (9th Cir.
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plaintiffs free to argue that the narrow Birnbaum purchaser-seller
doctrine was no longer valid as the basis for standing under rule 1 0b-
5 and to claim standing as investors who, as a result of fraud, had
failed to take advantage of an investment opportunity and had suf-
fered injury. 97 To avoid this development, the Court made clear
its determination to limit any further attempts at expansion or cir-
cumvention of the Birnbaum rule:
Were we to agree with the Court of Appeals in this case, we would
leave the Birnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case erosion de-
pending on whether a particular group of plaintiffs were thought by
the court in which the issue was being litigated to be sufficiently more
discrete than the world of potential purchasers at large to justify an
exception. We do not believe that such a shifting and highly fact-
oriented disposition of the issue of who may bring a damage claim
for violation of Rule 10b-5 is a satisfactory basis for a rule of liability
imposed on the conduct of business transactions. Nor is it as con-
sistent as a straightforward application of the Birnbaum rule with the
other factors which support the retention of the rule.98
This language clearly suggests that lower courts, when considering
1Ob-5 claims in the future, should apply the purchaser-seller rule in
a "straightforward" manner rather than engaging in a particularized
judicial inquiry into the facts surrounding a complaint and applying
the various policy considerations used to justify the rule's preserva-
tion.
The mere reaffirmation of Birnbaum, however, leaves unre-
solved the issue of the current breadth of the purchaser-seller limita-
tion. Did the Court intend future application of the rule to deny
standing to those categories of plaintiffs that had been given standing
under rule 10b-5 since Birnbaum, or was the Court merely seeking
to arrest further expansion of the rule, thereby embracing a standing
doctrine that included these categories of plaintiffs? What exactly
did the Court mean by a "straightforward application of the Birn-
baum rule"? In the absence of further elaboration by the Court,
the rule's breadth can only by ascertained by careful consideration
of the factors underlying its retention.
This task is complicated considerably by the failure of the Court
to discuss the recent decisions that have liberalized the Birnbaum
limitation upon 10b-5 standing.99 Although the Supreme Court ex-
1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), revd., 421 U.S. 723 (1974). But cf. 421 U.S. at
754-55 (curt concedes that consent decree distinguishes Blue Chip plaintiffs from
general investing public).
97. See 421 U.S. at 739-49.
99. 421 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F,2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
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plicitly affirmed the Birnbaum rule, which might be taken to mean
"purchasers" and "sellers" in only their most literal sense, the
policies supporting the Court's definition of standing can be effec-
tuated by allowing standing in several of the factual situations that
have been determined by lower courts since Birnbaum to be within
the purchaser-seller limitation. 10 Full understanding of the impact
of these previous decisions and of precisely what the Blue Chip
Court meant by the Birnbaum rule will, of course, require further
judicial delineation. It is, nevertheless, entirely reasonable to antici-
pate future pronouncements and to argue that the Court did not in-
tend to invalidate totally those decisions that have liberalized stand-
ing under rule 1Ob-5. Obvious support for this conclusion is the fact
that, if the Court had wished to invalidate these decisions, it could
have done so expressly. It can be argued, of course, that the Court
sought to avoid any detailed discussion of the merits of each post-
Birnbaum decision. However, the Court must have realized that by
failing to dispose completely of the controversy engendered by these
post-Birnbaum decisions, it would be countenancing further argu-
ment in support of their continuing validity.
Equally important, the majority made repeated references to the
lower courts' general acceptance of the Birnbaum rule' 0 1 and made
no mention of the continued "erosion" of the standing doctrine.
This suggests that the Court did not consider the rule to be a literal
purchaser-seller limitation but instead viewed it as encompassing
post-Birnbaum developments. For example, Justice Rehnquist
stated that
[t]he longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress'
failure to reject Birnbaum's reasonable interpretation of the wording
of section 10(b), wording which is directed towards injury suffered
"in connection with the purchase or sale" of securitjjes, argues signifi-
cantly in favor of the acceptance of the Birnbaum rule by this
Court.
0 2
The emphasis on the acceptance rather than on the modification of
the rule by lower courts implies a general satisfaction with the rule
in its current application.
These arguments suggest that the Court's intention was to limit
future expansion of the standing requirements under rule lOb-5
rather than to cut back on widely accepted decisions that have elabo-
nied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir. 1972).
100. See text at notes 105-80 infra.
101. 421 U.S. at 731-33, 755.
102. 421 U.S. at 733.
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rated on the meaning of "purchase" and "sale." Nevertheless, in
order to establish more precisely the content of the Birnbaum rule
after Blue Chip, it will be helpful to examine post-Birnbaum cases
that have liberalized the standing doctrine.1"' This section of the
Note will first consider two categories that are generally defined by
the factual basis of the underlying securities transaction: the forced-
seller situation and cases of aborted transactions.104  It will then
103. An important case that need not be discussed here at great length is Eason
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974). In that case, Judge, now Justice, Stevens rejected the Birn-
baum rule and concluded that investors, not only actual purchasers or sellers, were
the class of persons Congress intended to protect under the statute. 490 F.2d at 659.
Speaking for the court, he remarked that "[w]e are inclined to think that the extent
of the consistency in applying Birnbaum is overstated and is less important than an
independent appraisal of an important issue arising in an area of the law which, de-
spite the age of the statute, is still in an embryonic stage of development." 490 F.2d
at 661 (footnote omitted). This approach is virtually the same as that proposed by
the Blue Chip dissent, see text at notes 83-92 supra, and was clearly rejected by the
majority in Blue Chip, see 421 U.S. at 748-49.
104. Two other potential categories of plaintiffs-persons suing derivatively and
so-called de facto sellers-do not seem to present issues directly affected by Blue
Chip and will only be discussed briefly.
Shareholders of a corporation who did not personally purchase or sell securities
have been denied standing to sue as individuals, although they have been permitted
to sue in a derivative capacity on behalf of the corporation. See Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970). In this situation, the Birnbaum policy considerations
will be fulfilled since there must be a determination of whether the corporation was
itself a purchaser or seller, even though this determination may be difficult to make.
See, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (issuance by a cor-
poration of its own shares constitutes a sale). Where the award of damages is made
directly to the suing plaintiff class rather than to the corporation, see, e.g., Perlman
v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), an objection to this analysis may arise.
In this situation, the plaintiff will be the direct beneficiary of the suit for damages
under rule 10b-5 without his having been a purchaser or seller. However, the fact
remains that the corporation itself must have been associated with a purchase or sale
and the evidentiary considerations to which the purchaser-seller doctrine is addressed
will be met. Any possible problem of vexatious litigation arises not from a failure
to adhere to the Birnbaum doctrine but from the equitable considerations that coun-
tenance awarding damages to the plaintiff in a derivative action. It is the latter doc-
trine that ought to be reexamined if allowing derivative lob-5 suits should, in fact,
lead to vexatious litigation.
A similar rationale should exclude de facto sellers from application of the Birn-
baum rule. In James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973), the Sixth
Circuit applied the de facto seller doctrine to permit a lOb-5 action where plaintiff
was beneficiary of a testamentary trust from which securities allegedly had been sold
by the trustee in a fraudulent fashion. Plaintiff alleged that there existed an inter-
locking directorate between the trustee, Old State Bank, and Gerber Products Com-
pany, and that the sale by the trustee of the trust's securities was at an unusually
low fair market value. Although plaintiff had not personally bought or sold securi-
ties, the court recognized her right to seek recovery under lOb-5 since, "[als benefi-
ciary, she was the person who was to be benefitted by the sale and thus she had
the interests of a de facto seller. In this respect she is much closer to the transac-
tion than the plaintiffs in the Birnbaum case." 483 F.2d at 948-49.
The court found only a formal distinction between technical and beneficial own.
ership of the securities where the trustee, as party to the alleged fraud, could not
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consider a category based upon the nature of the remedy sought:
cases involving suits for injunctive relief.
A. The Forced-Seller Doctrine
Several courts have interpreted the rule set down in the Birn-
baum decision to mean that standing under rule lOb-5 could be
granted to plaintiffs who did not actually purchase or sell securi-
ties.1°5 One such class of plaintiffs are those who will be compelled
to sell or convert their shares as a result of defendant's fraud. The
basis on which these plaintiffs are classified as sellers for standing
purposes is the loss of control by these plaintiffs over the disposition
of their stock: they must either sell their shares at an economic loss
or retain worthless securities. 10
The first case to establish the forced-seller doctrine was Vine v.
Beneficial Finance Co.'0 7  Vine held Class A shares in Crown
Finance, a company that was the target of a merger by Beneficial.
He alleged that Beneficial, acting in concert with Crown's officers,
conspired to purchase from Crown's directors Class B shares at a
greatly inflated price, while acquiring Class A shares from the other
shareholders at a greatly reduced price. After purchasing 95 per
cent of Crown's Class A shares, the defendants completed a short-
form merger. 0 This merger left Vine and the other Class A share-
holders with only the alternatives of selling their stock to Beneficial
at an inadequate price or retaining stock in a nonexistent com-
pany.10
9
be expected to bring an action. Like the plaintiffs in a derivative action, the de facto
seller is perceived as a real party in interest, to whom a 10b-5 remedy should be avail-
able. The granting of standing to this category of plaintiffs does not pose the prob-
lems that concerned the Court in Blue Chip. In particular, cases such as Tames are
not conducive to vexatious litigation, for the plaintiffs recovery is limited to the value
of securities already sold.
As with derivation actions, any problems that arise in the de facto seller case re-
sult from the equitable doctrines that generally give standing to parties with beneficial
interests. If causes of action under rule lob-5 lead to vexatious litigation, the analyt-
ically sound remedy would be a reevaluation of these doctrines, not a misplaced appli-
cation of the Birnbaum rule.
105. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); A.I.
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
106. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967).
107. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
108. 374 F.2d at 630-31. Crown Finance, being a Delaware corporation, was
subject to short-form merger without a stockholders vote when Beneficial acquired
95 per cent of Crown's total outstanding shares. See DEr. CoDE ANN.. tit. 8, §
253(a) (1975).
109. 374 F.2d at 634.
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The district court dismissed the action on the ground that since
Vine had failed either to accept the tender offer or to sell his stock
after the merger, he did not qualify as a "seller" of securities under the
Birnbaum rule.110 In reversing the district court, Judge Feinberg,
writing for the Second Circuit, noted that "as a practical matter
[Vine] must eventually become a party to a 'sale,' as that term has
always been used.""' Thus, it would be a "needless formality" for
the court to require an actual sale; the disappearance of Crown
Finance had effectively converted Vine's stock into a claim for
cash."'
A second type of forced transaction that has arisen in the con-
text of a consummated merger is illustrated by the Second Circuit's
decision in Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.," 8 where the
plaintiff was forced to sell his shares of stock because of fraud.
Plaintiff Crane had made a tender offer to purchase shares of Air
Brake. To frustrate the attempted take-over of Air Brake by Crane,
Air Brake enlisted American Standard, Inc. (Standard) in a scheme
to drive up the price of Air Brake shares. On the day the tender
offer was to expire, Standard "painted the tape" in Air Brake stock
by simultaneously buying on the open market and selling in secret
a large block of Air Brake shares. This activity raised the market
price of Air Brake stock and thereby deterred stockholder acceptance
of Crane's tender offer. Air Brake then merged into Standard.
Since Standard was a chief competitor of Crane, antitrust considera-
tions made it necessary for Crane to sell most of its shares in the
new company. Crane instituted suit prior to the merger to prevent
its consummation and to obtain damages for frustration of its tender
offer." '4 The Second Circuit, reversing the dismissal of the rule
1Ob-5 claim by the district court,1 5 held that Crane fit within the
forced-seller rationale of Vine. The fraudulent manipulation of the
market by Standard "made Crane a forced seller . . . under threat
of a divestiture action to be brought by Standard under the antitrust
laws."" 6  Citing Vine, the court found it unnecessary for the sale
itself to have been made in reliance on the fraud:
110. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), revd.
in part and affd. in part, 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
111. 374 'F.2d at 634.
112. 374 F.2d at 634.
113. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
114. 419 F.2d at 790-91.
115. Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
reyd. sub nom. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
116. 419 F.2d at 798 (footnote omitted).
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[W]here the success of a fraud does not require an exercise of voli-
tion by the plaintiff, but instead requires an exercise of volition by
other persons, there need be no showing that the plaintiff himself re-
lied upon the deception. "What must be shown is that there was de-
ception which mislead [other] stockholders and that this was in fact
the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury." 11"
The nondisclosure by Standard of its market activity, which allegedly
resulted in the failure of Crane's tender offer and in Crane's sale
of Air Brake securities, fulfilled these requirements."'
The forced-seller rationale has also been applied to allow stand-
ing where a merger has been announced but not yet consummated.
Such a result was reached by the Eighth Circuit in Travis v. Anthes
Imperial Ltd."' In this case, Molson Industries (Molson) made a
tender offer in an attempt to acquire Anthes Imperial Limited
(Anthes), most of whose shareholders were Canadian. Molson ex-
tended its tender offer to Anthes' Canadian shareholders but failed
to extend the offer to Anthes' American shareholders. These
American shareholders were allegedly induced to refrain from sell-
ing their shares on the open market by a promise from Molson to
buy the American shares upon the expiration of the tender offer at
a price "substantially equivalent" to that received by the Canadian
shareholders. However, after acquiring over ninety per cent of
Anthes outstanding common stock, Molson announced its intention
to merge with Anthes and offered to purchase the outstanding
American shares for a price substantially below that of the open mar-
ket at the time the tender offer was made. Molson's announcement
of a merger eliminated an open market for Anthes stock, and the
plaintiffs' only remaining possibility of sale was to Molson on terms
set by Molson. Plaintiffs accepted the inadequate offer after being
threatened with both its imminent withdrawal and a delisting of the
stock from the only stock exchange on which it was traded.'
20
117. 419 F.2d at 797, quoting Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
The court in Vine recognized that in dispensing with a "reliance" requirement it
was, in effect, liberally interpreting the "in connection with" requirement of rule
lOb-5. See 374 F.2d at 635. The context in which the forced seller problem arises
-a sale of securities subsequent to the defendant's alleged fraud-forces a court that
desires to grant lob-5 standing to interpret broadly the "in connection with" require-
ment. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1973).
For a discussion of the "in connection with" requirement in light of Blue Chip, see
note 146 infra & text at notes 142-46 infra. For a brief discussion of the "in connec-
tion with" requirement, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., ScUrrns REGULATION
1229-30 (3d ed. 1972).
118. See 419 F.2d at 797-98.
119. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
120. 473 F.2d at 518-20.
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The Travis court held that the plaintiffs could be accorded stand-
ing either as actual sellers or under the forced-seller doctrine.
12 1
The court believed the facts in this case fit the pattern of Vine, with
two exceptions: (1) In Vine the merger was completed while here
technical details remained to be completed; and (2) in Vine a pre-
sent legal requirement to sell existed while here the compulsion to
sell resulted from the practical consequences of the elimination of
the open market. 1 2  Finding these differences immaterial,2 3 the
court established what very likely marks the outer limit of the forced-
seller doctrine prior to Blue Chip: Elimination of an open market
by an unconsummated merger resulting from fraud is tantamount to
a sale of securities for purposes of rule lOb-5.
The exact scope of the forced-seller doctrine established by these
cases is unclear. Courts after Vine have applied the doctrine to both
consummated mergers'24 and liquidations121 that were fraudulently
induced. Yet when dealing with unconsummated mergers, the
courts have 'been generally unwilling to grant 1Ob-5 standing. 20  Al-
though fraud may have reduced the value of plaintiffs' shares in this
latter group of cases, sale on the open market provided an option
for disposition not available to plaintiffs in a consummated merger.'
27
It also remains to be resolved whether the forced-seller doctrine,
as defined by these cases, remains good law in light of Blue Chip.
The Court in Blue Chip was primarily concerned with strike suits
and problems of proof of actual injury based upon uncorroborated
oral testimony. 28  Neither consideration seems to apply to those
plaintiffs who have been granted standing as forced sellers in the
context of consummated mergers. Although the Blue Chip Court
repeatedly construed purchase or sale in a narrow sense and ex-
plicitly rejected the "functional equivalence" arguments of the plain-
121. 473 F.2d at 521-22.
122. 473 F.2d at 523.
123. 473 F.2d at 523.
124. See, e.g., Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Del. 1965).
125. See, e.g., Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970); Dudley
v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
858 (1971).
126. See, e.g., Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1970); Greenstein v.
Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
127. In Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973), where the
court granted 10b-5 standing in the context of an unconsummated merger, the open
market for the shares in question had been eliminated. See text at notes 119-22
supra.
128. See text at notes 64-70 supra.
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tiffs in that case,'29 the forced-seller rationale is not inconsistent with
either of these views.
130
In cases such as Vine,13 ' the plaintiffs have no option except to
sell to the newly merged firm. There is no speculation as to whether
the plaintiff would engage in the sale transaction, and the status of
a minority shareholder who is being "frozen out" is an objectively
demonstrable fact. Thus, an actual sale is indeed a "needless for-
mality." Moreover, since the number of shares involved is fixed,
the dangers of an unlimited plaintiff class or of speculative damages
based solely on oral testimony are not present. Hence, Vine appears
to be within the scope of the Birnbaum rule as defined by Blue Chip.
The plaintiffs under the Vine rationale as applied in Crane3 '
stand in a somewhat different position. Rather than holding shares
whose value could only be realized by a sale to the defendant, Crane
was forced to sell its shares on the market as the end result of Stand-
ard's scheme to frustrate Crane's tender offer to Air Brake share-
holders. One commentator has suggested that Crane was incorrectly
decided because plaintiff's complaint concerned an injury caused by
defendant's interference with the tender offer rather than by the
forced sale of Air Brake shares.' 33  This view suggests that Crane
allows the mere purchase or sale of securities by a plaintiff to provide
him with standing to litigate an altogether different issue of corporate
mismanagement, even when the injury was not a direct result of the
securities transaction. This criticism of Crane, however, ignores the
fact that defendant's securities fraud not only caused plaintiff's "in-
jury" but also made it necessary for Crane to sell its shares.
Perhaps a more substantial criticism in light of Blue Chip is that
Crane should not have prevailed without a showing that Standard's
stockmarket activity dissuaded Air Brake shareholders from accept-
ing Crane's tender offer. Setting aside consideration of the ultimate
merger for a moment, it would appear that the individual share-
holders who did not accept Crane's tender offer would be precluded
by Blue Chip from having a lOb-5 action against Standard: they had
neither purchased nor sold securities.' 34 Thus, it may be argued
129. See text at notes 76-78 supra.
130. But see Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial
Oak, 80 DICK. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1975).
131. See text at notes 98-112 supra.
132. See text at notes 113-18 supra.
133. Whitaker, supra note 95, at 567. See also Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970) (fraud
interfering with tender offer does not constitute fraud in connection with the purchase
of a security).
134. See text at notes 138-60 infra.
December 1976]
Michigan Law Review
that Crane is similarly precluded since it must rely on the same evi-
dentiary base as the individual shareholders.
However, Crane's burden of proof appears to be different. It
need not demonstrate that any individual shareholder failed to pur-
chase or sell but instead need only show that Standard's fraudulent
activity affected the shareholders as a class in such a way as to frus-
trate Crane's tender offer. Although the motivations of any partic-
ular shareholder would be speculative, underwriters and other finan-
cial experts could determine the impact of market price movement
on the shareholders as a class. While this burden may be difficult
to sustain, allowing such a claim does not pose the dangers expressed
in Blue Chip of recognizing an unlimited plaintiff class or of granting
huge, speculative damages to undeserving plaintiffs. Although the
fraudulent frustration of a tender offer vel non may not provide
standing for a rule 10b-5 action, 185 Crane should remain a valid prec-
edent for standing where there is a forced sale of securities after
a merger whose consummation was predicated upon a fraudulent
frustration of a tender offer. At the very least, damages that are
directly attributable to the sale of stock should be recoverable and
such equitable relief as dissolution of the merger should be con-
sidered.
Plaintiffs involved in unconsummated mergers appear to qualify
for lOb-5 standing if an actual sale has occurred, as in Travis." 6 It
is doubtful, however, whether plaintiffs who have not sold can claim
to be forced sellers under the Vine rationale.' 37  These plaintiffs
would claim that the elimination of an open market placed them in
a situation similar to that in Vine where the plaintiffs had either to
acquiesce in the offer from the company in control or hold shares for
which there was no market. However, this analogy is imperfect. The
compulsion to sell in Vine was a legal one: If the plaintiffs had
failed to accept the offer of the newly merged company, their shares
would no longer have had any value because the old company would
have ceased to exist. This element is not present in the case of an
unconsummated merger, since their shares still represent stock in an
existing corporation. Whenever the merger is unconsummated, the
shareholders retain an element of choice over whether to sell. Their
position is not unlike that of a shareholder in a closely held corpora-
tion that has a limited market for its shares.
135. See Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 US. 909 (1970). See generally text at notes 152-60 infra.
136. For a discussion of Travis, see text at notes 119-23 supra.
137. For a discussion of Vine, see tat at notes 98-112, 131-32 supra.
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The shareholder in the unconsummated merger situation also re-
presents a potential source of vexatious litigation. To allow standing
in this case would allow suits to be brought whenever the possibility
of merger on allegedly unsatisfactory terms has deflated the market
value of the stock. The threat of a suit that could delay the merger
or that could create adverse publicity sufficient to affect the market
value of the stock involved may result in a settlement value substan-
tially disproportionate to the merits of the claim. Hence, the grant-
ing of standing to nonsellers in the context of an unconsummated
merger appears inconsistent with Blue Chip.
B. Aborted Transactions
Another category of cases in which the courts have expanded the
purchaser-seller doctrine encompasses plaintiffs who, because of
fraud, have been frustrated in their attempt to purchase or sell secu-
rities. Although commentators have made distinctions between
aborted sellers and aborted purchasers, 138 it seems more useful in
light of Blue Chip to classify aborted transactions according to three
subcategories:
(1) situations in which the individual makes a "delayed" pur-
chase or sale of securities subsequent to the frustration of
an intended transaction;
(2) transactions that are based upon a contractual agreement;
and
(3) transactions that are not based upon contractual agree-
ments.
Although causes of action have been allowed under varying circum-
stances in all of these cases,13 9 the rationale of Blue Chip has likely
eliminated the third class and may portend a narrowing of the first
class.
The Birnbaum decision seemed to imply that to gain standing
under rule lOb-5, any purchase or sale of securities must have been
contemporaneous with the commission of the fraud. However, in
the case of Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co.,"40 the district court granted
standing where there was a sale of securities subsequent to the fraud.
The plaintiffs in Stockwell were shareholders who had been dis-
138. See, e.g., Comment, 24 HINGs LJ. 1007, supra note 3, at 1016.
139. See Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (de-
layed sale); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(contractual agreement); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., (N.D. Ill., Dec. 31,
1969) [1969-1970 Transfer Binder) FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,591 (noncon-
tractual transaction).
140. 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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suaded from selling their shares by the assurances of their broker
that the shares would rise in value. After learning that the repre-
sentations had 'been false, the plaintiffs sold their shares at a loss
and brought a rule 10b-5 action. 4' The Stockwetl court considered
the fact that there was an actual sale, albeit delayed, sufficient to
satisfy the Birnbaum rule. It reasoned that "[t]he words 'in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security' contained in Section
10(b) and in Rule 1Ob-5 do not require that the purchase or sale
immediately follow the alleged fraud."' 42  Both the Second Cir-
cuit'43 and the Eighth Circuit 44 have confirmed the Stockwell ap-
proach and granted standing under rule 1 Ob-5 where there was only
a "delayed" sale subsequent to an aborted tf'ansaction.
Although no cases have been found relating to a delayed pur-
chase, the same rationale would appear to be applicable. 45  The
delayed purchase or sale literally complies with the Birnbaum doc-
trine and is technically unaffected by Blue Chip. It should be recog-
nized, however, that the policies underlying the affirmation of Birn-
baum by Blue Chip portend a possible contraction of the phrase "in
connection with" that would significantly limit the applicability of the
delayed purchaser or seller rationale.' 46
The second class of aborted transactions to be considered, illus-
trated by Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec,147 is predicated upon
a contractual relationship. In Commerce Reporting, the defendants
entered into a contract with plaintiffs to sell all of their capital stock
141. 252 F. Supp. at 219.
142. 252 F. Supp. at 219.
143. See A.T. Brod &Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Opper v. Han-
cock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
144. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
145. One potential difference is that the maximum amount of stock that one
might be dissuaded from selling is obviously limited to the amount held. However,
with the aborted purchaser, the subsequent purchase of stock may be sparse evidence
as to what the plaintiff had been previously dissuaded from buying. Hence, the max-
imum damages the aborted purchaser might claim may be too speculative for recovery
absent corroborating evidence of a specific amount..
146. Rule 10b-5 suits for a subsequent purchase or sale would seem to be subject
to the same policy objections that support the Birnbaum rule. Although a subsequent
purchase or sale may enhance the credibility of the plaintiff concerning his prior in-
tentions and may possibly serve to limit damages, see note 145 supra, it neither serves
as an objective indication of the plaintiffs prior intent nor clarifies the "hazy issues
of historical fact the proof of which [may depend] almost entirely on oral testi-
mony." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 743 (1975). Thus,
while the scope of the delayed purchaser-seller doctrine may not be directly limited
by Blue Chip, the radiations of Blue Chip in subsequent rule lOb-5 cases may effec-
tively limit the applicability of this rationale to delayed purchases or sales that bear
a close nexus to the fraud itself.
147. 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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and appointed the plaintiffs as their agent to effectuate the sale to
an assignee. After the plaintiffs had obtained a purchaser and the
terms of sale had been set, the defendant sold the stock to other
parties. The plaintiffs alleged that their participation had been in-
duced only to promote the highest possible sale price of defendant's
stock to the other purchasers. 48
In response to the defendant's contention that there was no pur-
chase or sale, the court first noted that the definition of "security"
in the Exchange Act includes an investment contract 149 and that the
definition of "sale" includes "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose
of [securities]."' 150 The court went on to hold that it was sufficient
to allege that the fraud was in connection with the plaintiffs' contract
to sell to another party their rights under their agreement with the
defendants, and that "it was unnecessary to prove a consummated,
or closed, purchase or sale as condition to the institution of such a
suit." 151
Plaintiffs who claim a securities fraud in an aborted contractual
transaction clearly will still obtain standing under rule 1Ob-5 after
Blue Chip. As that Court itself stated:
[T]he holders of puts, calls, options and other contractual rights or
duties to purchase or sell securities have been recognized as "pur-
chasers" or "sellers" of securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5, not be-
cause of a judicial conclusion that they were similarly situated to
"purchasers" or "sellers," but because the definitional provisions of
the 1934 Act themselves grant them such a status.
152
However, it is equally clear that those claiming standing due to
an aborted transaction not based upon a contractual agreement face
nearly insurmountable obstacles. The plaintiffs falling within this
last category include investors who would have bought but for an
"unduly gloomy representation or omission of favorable material"'153
concerning the stock and shareholders who would have sold but for
an unduly rosy representation or failure to disclose unfavorable infor-
mation. These plaintiffs have neither a contractual basis for their
claim nor the status of delayed purchasers or sellers.
It is true that such plaintiffs have been granted standing in some
cases where the particular factual situation was found by the courts
148. 290 F. Supp. at 717.
149. 290 F. Supp. at 719, citing Securities Exchange Act § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(9)(10) (1970 &Supp. V 1975).
150. 290 F. Supp. at 719, quoting Securities Exchange Act § 3(a) (14), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(14) (1970).
151. 290 F. Supp. at 718.
152. 421 U.S. at 751.
153. 421 U.S. at 737.
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to provide the evidentiary equivalence of a purchase or sale. In
Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co.,'54 for example, the plaintiffs
were shareholders of Electronic Specialty who had been fraudulently
dissuaded by the company's directors from accepting a tender offer
made by International Controls Corporation. The defendant direc-
tors had arranged to sell their own shares to International Controls
before the expiration of the tender offer. Although the house coun-
sel for Electronic Specialty knew that International Controls would
not accept a telegraphic acceptance of the tender offer, he advised
plaintiffs that such an acceptance would be satisfactory. The plain-
tiffs' telegraphic acceptance on the day before the expiration of the
tender offer was subsequently rejected. 155  1
The Neuman court reasoned that the Birnbaum rule should not
bar an action under rule 10b-5 where the plaintiff can prove "that
his reliance on any alleged misrepresentations was the cause of his
refusal to tender. In light of such proof, it should be no great task
to determine when and if the shareholder would have accepted the
offer, and thereby attain a calculable measure of damages."'50  The
court considered the plaintiff class in Neuman capable of demon-
strating sufficient proof of individual reliance upon defendant's
fraudulent misrepresentations to justify standing. The same ration-
ale has been applied to an aborted purchase transaction where there
was no actual purchase of securities either concurrent with or sub-
sequent to the fraud.
57
It is unlikely that cases such as Neuman, in which there was
neither a purchase or sale of securities nor a transaction based upon
a contractual agreement, will still be considered good law after Blue
Chip. The Blue Chip Court expressly renounced an interpretation
of Birnbaum that would depend "on whether a particular group of
plaintiffs were thought by the court in which the issue was being
litigated to be sufficiently more discrete than the world of potential
plaintiffs at large to justify an exception."' 58 Without a well-defined
classification that is not dependent on an evaluation of the facts sur-
rounding the particular case,' 59 the federal courts would be open to
154. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1969) [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 92,591.
155. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,592.
156. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SaEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,592-94,
157. See Goodman v. H. Hentry & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. IL. 1967).
158. 421 U.S. at 755.
159. It should be noted that classifications such as forced sellers are dependent
on~the facts only in a broad sense. The court need only find the general nature
of the transaction (e.g., status as minority shareholder after a merger) to ascertain
the position of the plaintiff for purposes of standing.
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the vexatious litigation that the Blue Chip Court feared.
For example, dissatisfied shareholders could claim that they
failed to take advantage of a tender offer as a result of being fraud-
ulently induced to retain their shares. If Neuman remains a valid
precedent, a court will have to sift through the evidence alleged by
shareholders who failed to accept a tender offer to determine if that
evidence was sufficiently objective or corroborated to support stand-
ing. Such an action may turn on evidence that is speculative but
that a jury could decide to weigh favorably, and therefore the case
would be virtually impossible to dispose of on a motion for summary
judgment. This is the type of "shifting and highly fact-oriented dis-
position of the [standing] issue" that the Blue Chip Court deemed
unsatisfactory as a basis for a rule of liability. 160
C. Injunctive Relief
In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,161 the Supreme
Court held that "it is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophy-
lactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for mone-
tary damages."' 62  Although this was not a rule 10b-5 action,1
6 3
lower federal courts have applied the rationale of that case to dis-
pense with the purchaser-seller requirement in private 10b-5 actions
for injunctive relief.'6 4
In Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 65 for example, the
plaintiffs were minority shareholders of S & H Kress Company who
sought both damages and an injunction under rule lOb-5 against
Genesco, the majority shareholder of Kress. Genesco acquired con-
trol of Kress through private purchases and a tender offer and
allegedly intended to use the company's undervalued real estate to
finance the acquisition and to appropriate Kress' assets for its own
160. 421 U.S. at 755.
161. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
162. 375 U.S. at 193.
163. The Court was confronted with fraudulent manipulation of the securities
market by an investment advisor. It granted the injunctive relief sought by the SEC
and ordered the defendant-advisor to disclose his manipulative practices to his clients.
164. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 910 (1972); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
The purchaser-seller rule imposes no limitation on the standing of the Securities
Exchange Commission to bring actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). See 421 U.S. at 751
n.14.
165. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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benefit. The plaintiffs bought Kress stock after the tender offer ter-
minated, and no claim of fraudulent activity was made concerning
that offer. 1 6
The plaintiffs sought relief on two grounds. First, they claimed
that Genesco had fraudulently induced them to purchase Kress stock
through an implied representation that it would manage Kress prop-
erly and through nondisclosure of important information about
Kress's undervalued real estate. The plaintiffs' second claim was
that Genesco had manipulated the market price of Kress stock after
plaintiffs had purchased their shares.' 0 7  Pointing out that the only
purchases or sales of securities involved other Kress shareholders,
the court held that the causal relationship between defendant's fraud
and plaintiffs' injury was insufficient to support a claim for dam-
ages. "" In doing so, it accepted the SEC's argument as amicus
curiae that to allow this action would "convert any instance of corpor-
ate mismanagement into a rule 1 Ob-5 case."'0 "
However, the court granted the plaintiffs standing to sue for in-
junctive relief to prevent any further stock manipulation:
[We do] not regard the fact that plaintiffs have not sold their stock
as controlling on the claim for injunctive relief. The complaint al-
leges a manipulative scheme which is still continuing. While doubt-
less the Commission could seek to halt such practices, present stock-
holders are also logical plaintiffs to play "an important role in en-
forcement" of the Act in this way . . . . Deceitful manipulation
of the market price of publicly-owned stock is precisely one of the
types of injury to investors at which the Act and the Rule were
aimed.170
The court expressly recognized that the elements necessary to main-
tain a suit for injunctive relief were different from those required
in an action for damages:
[T]he claim for damages.., founders both on proof of loss and the
the causal connection with the alleged violation of the rule; on the
other hand, the claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these issues,
may cure harm suffered by continuing shareholders and would afford
complete relief against the rule 10b-5 violation for the future.' 7 '
166. 384 F.2d at 542.
167. 384 F.2d at 542. Plaintiffs claimed that after their purchase of shares,
Genesco manipulated the market price by minimizing dividends in order to encourage
the minority shareholders to sell their shares to defendant at depressed prices. 384
F.2d at 542.
168. 384 F.2d at 546.
169. 384 F.2d at 545.
170. 384 F.2d at 546-47.
171. 384 F.2d at 547. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
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The status of the injunctive relief exception after Blue Chip is
unclear. Since the plaintiffs in that case did not seek injunctive re-
lief, the Court had no occasion to address the issue. Justice Rehn-
quist, in fact, repeatedly emphasized that the Court's decision was
confined to private damage actions.172 The language of Blue Chip
emphasizes a restrictive interpretation of the purchaser-seller re-
quirement.17 3  Construed literally, this language could be taken to
support a denial of standing for plaintiffs who are neither purchasers
nor sellers regardless of the relief sought.
There are, however, several reasons why a more liberal standing
requirement is appropriate. The Supreme Court has dispensed with
the purchaser-seller doctrine as a limitation on the SEC in bringing
suits for injunctive relief under rule 1Ob-5.'7 4 Although application
of this doctrine to private actions would not be flatly inconsistent,
the legal issues and policy considerations in both situations are
closely related. 71 As Judge Hufstedler, whose Ninth Circuit dissent
in Blue Chip the Court found persuasive, noted:
The purchaser-seller rule has only peripheral relationship to suits for
an injunction. A rule that no one could obtain preventive relief who
could not prove that the fraud had already been consummated would
be quixotic. Moreover, expansion of standing to bring suits for in-
junctive relief does not entail the risk of strike suits or of exposure
to imponderable liability that expanded standing in damage actions
threatens.' 76
To the extent that a suit for injunctive relief may disrupt business
operations.or may adversely affect such activities as the consumma-
tion of a merger, 177 it may create an opportunity for strike suits
brought only for settlement purposes. The danger of allowing such
suits, however, is offset by two countervailing factors. First, as
Judge Hufstedler noted, there is no danger of "draconian damage
claims."'78  Elimination of the possibility of direct financial loss to
the corporation and gain to the plaintiff reduces both the threat
posed by strike suits and the incentive of plaintiffs to litigate.
172. 421 U.S. at 725, 727, 730. See 421 US. at 737-49.
173. See text at note 98 supra.
174. See note 164 supra.
175. See SEC v. National Sec., 'Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 471 n.4 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
176. 492 F.2d at 145 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
177. The pendency of a law suit may adversely affect the market value of the
shares of both companies involved and, even if a suitable exchange rate can be deter-
mined, the companies may be unwilling to consummate a merger that may have to
be undone.
178. 492 F.2d at 147 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
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More importantly, allowing injunctive relief is an effective means
of precluding a continuation of fraudulent practices. This was the
major reason for allowing the SEC to seek injunctive relief under
rule 1Ob-5.179 In granting a similar right to a minority shareholder
who sought to deter the fraudulent acquisition of his corporation, the
Third Circuit recognized that "[a] suit which seeks to enjoin de-
ceptive practices which if continued would lead to completed pur-
chases or sales that give rise to a cause of action under § 10(b) is
not inconsistent with [the policy of the Exchange Act] and will in
fact promote free and open public securities markets."'180
Thus, cases establishing standing for shareholders to enjoin
threatened or continuing fraudulent activity do not significantly con-
travene the policy considerations of Blue Chip. Although Blue Chip
represents a trend toward a more conservative interpretation of the
scope of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, suits for injunctive relief may
contribute significantly to furthering the fundamental policies of
these provisions without imposing undue hardship upon business
activity. Hence, cases allowing injunctive relief without requiring
a purchaser-seller requirement should continue to be valid.
179. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 463 (1969).
180. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970).
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